Persecution of Clergy by the Hierarchy of the Moscow Patriarchate for Their Anti-War Stance
A talk by Fr Valerian Dunin-Barkovskiy, prepared for the General Assembly of the Archdiocese of Orthodox Churches of Russian Tradition in Western Europe, Paris, 6–7 November 2026.
Your Eminence, Metropolitan John!
Dear Bishops, Fathers, brothers and sisters, delegates to the General Assembly of our Archdiocese!
As some of you know, on the advice and with the blessing of Metropolitan John, I have for the past three years led the non-profit organisation Peace Unto All. Its purpose is to work for peace and to assist victims of Russia's military aggression against Ukraine, particularly clergy who have suffered for seeking to live according to the commandments of our Saviour: ‘Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called the children of God.’ Many parishes of the Archdiocese already support our movement. Today I should like to tell you more about our work and, especially, about those whom we defend and support.
The peacemakers — the ‘children of God’ of our own day — have, unwittingly, also fulfilled another of the Beatitudes from the Sermon on the Mount: ‘Blessed are ye, when men shall revile you, and persecute you, and shall say all manner of evil against you falsely, for my sake.’ Alas, it is not merely the representatives of a militarised junta, whose ‘role’ seems to be to revile and persecute peacemakers, who speak ‘all manner of evil’ against them. Oh no! They are persecuted by those whom God Himself has commanded to be peacemakers — the ‘chief priests and elders’, the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church. Our very brethren with whom we were reunited in 2019. I wish to tell you about cases of which I have been a witness, and leave you to draw your own conclusions.
I believe it is particularly important to speak about this here, at the assembly of our Archdiocese, because what is happening cannot be dismissed as an internal matter of the Moscow Patriarchate within Russia, nor presented as isolated disputes between priests and their diocesan bishops. We are faced not with a series of chance incidents but with a recurring practice which affects dozens of clergy and is directly sanctioned by the administrative apparatus of the Moscow Patriarchate. In some cases, ecclesiastical persecution has been accompanied by persecution by the state: administrative fines, criminal proceedings, threats and forced departure from Russia. Thus, for some priests, opposition to the war brings persecution by the state and punishment by their own ecclesiastical hierarchy at the same time.
A fundamental question confronts us: what place remains for Christian conscience in the life of the Church if a priest's commitment to peace and the Gospel, his refusal to support the war and to participate in its religious justification, become grounds for suspension from ministry, deposition from holy orders and, in effect, expulsion from the ecclesial community to which he has devoted his life?
It is particularly revealing that in many of the cases under consideration the issue is precisely a refusal to participate in the religious justification of the war against Ukraine. Priests face ecclesiastical penalties simply because they will not offer a prayer for victory in a war that brings death and destruction, including to Orthodox Christians.
First, however, I should like to consider one particularly telling phenomenon: the persecution of priests who refused to recite the so-called ‘Prayer for Holy Rus’.’
1. The Prayer for Holy Rus’ and the Persecution of Those Who Refused to Recite It
Let me recall that on 25 September 2022 Patriarch Kirill first publicly recited, during the Divine Liturgy, a text which came to be known as the ‘Prayer for Holy Rus’’. No separate resolution concerning this prayer was adopted by the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church. There was not even a separate decree signed by Patriarch Kirill. The text was circulated by an instruction from Metropolitan Dionisy (Porubay), then Chancellor of the Moscow Patriarchate, addressed to ‘the Right Reverend bishops in the territory of Russia’. Today, any of you visiting the Azbuka or Posledovaniya websites can see that this text has become, as it were, a compulsory part of worship, although theological examination of it raises serious doubts about its conformity with the canons of the Holy Orthodox Church.
Within the Russian Federation, an explicit or implicit refusal to introduce this so-called ‘Prayer for Holy Rus’’ into the services has in practice become a serious ecclesiastical offence, for which clergy are suspended from ministry or deposed from holy orders. Among the canonical grounds invoked for such decisions is the 25th Apostolic Canon: refusal to comply with the instructions of the hierarchy and the Patriarch's blessing to recite the prayer is classified as a breach of the priestly oath — ‘perjury’. In other words, refusing to pronounce a non-canonical prayer becomes grounds for suspending or deposing a priest.
But what does the prayer itself contain? Its central theme is victory in war. Amid the Russian Federation's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, clergy and faithful are instructed to pray for victory in a war being waged by the Russian army on the territory of a neighbouring country inhabited by millions of Orthodox Christians. Behind these words about ‘victory’ lie actual military operations, devastated cities, people killed and the suffering of millions.
I should now like to give concrete examples — the lives of priests for whom refusing to recite this prayer led to suspension from ministry, proceedings before an ecclesiastical court, deposition from holy orders and, in some cases, forced departure from their country.
2. Specific Cases of the Persecution of Clergy
One of the first such cases to attract widespread international attention was that of Father Ioann Koval of Moscow. He did not refuse to recite the ‘Prayer for Holy Rus’’ during the services, but changed just one word: instead of ‘victory’, he said ‘peace’. Following denunciations by parishioners and a report from the rector of the church, the matter was referred to the diocesan authorities. On 2 February 2023 Patriarch Kirill signed a decree suspending Father Ioann from ministry. On 11 May 2023 the Moscow Diocesan Court ruled that he should be deposed from holy orders, and on 15 August 2023 the Patriarch confirmed the decision.
Even better known is the case of Archpriest Alexei Uminsky, rector of the Church of the Life-Giving Trinity in Khokhly, Moscow, to which he had devoted some thirty years of priestly ministry. Father Alexei repeatedly opposed the use of the Church's prayer to justify war and refused to recite the ‘Prayer for Holy Rus’’. On 3 January 2024 Patriarch Kirill signed a decree removing him as rector and suspending him from ministry. The decree was published on 10 January, and on 13 January — only three days later — the Moscow Diocesan Court ruled that Father Alexei should be deposed from holy orders. On 8 February 2024 Patriarch Kirill confirmed that decision. Thus, a priest who had served for more than thirty years was deprived of his orders after proceedings lasting only a matter of days following publication of the decree suspending him. The reason was his unwillingness to recite a prayer containing a petition for victory in the war. But matters did not end there. Swift ecclesiastical persecution was followed by the threat of criminal prosecution by the state. Father Alexei was forced to leave Russia urgently. He now serves here in Paris, on Boulevard Exelmans. You can speak to him yourselves and hear the details of his persecution.
Another Moscow priest, Father Andrei Kudrin, a cleric of the Church of the Icon of the Mother of God ‘The Life-Giving Spring’, chose a different way of expressing his position: instead of the prayer for victory, he read a prayer for the reconciliation of those at enmity. Moreover, it was a prayer from the Book of Needs published by the Moscow Patriarchate itself. On 23 April 2024 Patriarch Kirill suspended him from ministry. On 10 July 2024 the Moscow Diocesan Court ruled that Father Andrei should be deposed from holy orders, and on 14 August the Patriarch confirmed the ruling. A priest was thus deprived of his orders because, instead of a prayer for military victory which had not been formally approved by anyone, he read a prayer contained in an official liturgical book of the Church.
At Pascha in 2022, Archpriest Maxim Nagibin, rector of the Church of the Archangel Michael in the village of Nadezhnaya in Krasnodar Krai, delivered a sermon in which he called the war against Ukraine a crime and a disgrace to Russia. A denunciation was made against him, and administrative proceedings were initiated. On 14 November 2022 an ecclesiastical court ruled that Father Maxim should be deposed from holy orders.
In other cases, pressure from diocesan authorities took the form of prolonged restrictions and demands for public repentance. Thus Father Alexei Vtulov, a cleric of the Church of the Sign in Dubrovitsy, Moscow Region, was suspended from ministry for one year on 17 November 2023. In November 2024 the suspension was extended for a further three years, with the threat of deposition if he ‘failed to repent’.
The case of Archpriest Vadim Perminov of the Diocese of Kainsk is likewise revealing. On 19 April 2024 he wrote to Metropolitan Nikodim of Novosibirsk explaining that he could not pray for victory in a fratricidal war between Orthodox Christians. He appealed to Holy Scripture and to his own conscience. Once his position became known to the diocesan authorities, pressure was brought to bear on him: he was transferred to a rural parish and then suspended from ministry. Father Vadim has five children. Here, too, this is more than a disciplinary penalty: a man who has devoted his life to pastoral ministry has found himself in an extremely difficult situation because he refused to pray for victory in the war.
In some cases, ecclesiastical penalties were accompanied by a direct threat of criminal prosecution. Deacon Dmitry Baev of Kirov was suspended from ministry by a decree of Metropolitan Mark (Tuzhikov) of Vyatka on 11 March 2022, and deposed from holy orders in September 2022. At the same time, criminal proceedings were brought against him for allegedly spreading so-called ‘fake news’ about the Russian Armed Forces. His flat was searched; he was subsequently placed on the federal wanted list and included in the register of ‘extremists’. Dmitry Baev was forced to leave Russia with his family.
In the case of Father Alexander Dombrovsky of Bryansk Region, it was a denunciation by the churchwarden that prompted the security services to intervene. He was deposed from holy orders in 2023.
We must also mention Archpriest Sergiy Rybakov of Samara. In March 2023 Metropolitan Sergiy of Samara and Novokuybyshevsk told him that the FSB was taking an interest in him. Threats against the priest himself, his family and some parishioners followed. At the same time, problems arose concerning the church at Samara University, where Father Sergiy served as rector. On 15 September 2023 he was suspended from ministry.
Finally, the story of Hieromonk Iakov Vorontsov of Kazakhstan deserves particular attention. He spoke out against the war and came under pressure from the ecclesiastical authorities, followed by criminal prosecution. In 2023 proceedings were brought against him on charges of inciting discord. In May 2025 the case was closed on the grounds that no criminal offence had been committed. Nevertheless, in February 2026 he was again arrested on false charges, and in October 2026 he was sentenced to four years' imprisonment.
Other examples could be given: Father Ioann Burdin of the Diocese of Kostroma, who received a state-imposed fine and was suspended from ministry following an anti-war sermon; Archpriest Andrei Kordochkin, suspended from ministry after criticising the theological justification of the war; Father Dmitry Safronov, suspended for three years after serving memorial services for Alexei Navalny; and Father Konstantin Kokora of Moscow.
Taken together, these cases make it clear that we are not dealing with a handful of private disputes between individual priests and their ruling bishops. We see a recurring pattern: denunciations, summonses to bishops, pressure and demands for obedience, suspensions from ministry, ecclesiastical trials and deposition from holy orders. In some cases there were also threats of criminal prosecution, searches, police summonses and the opening of criminal cases. Many priests were forced to leave Russia, often with their families, yet ecclesiastical persecution continued even beyond the country's borders.
It is especially important to note that a considerable proportion of these decisions were taken or personally confirmed by Patriarch Kirill. The leadership of the Moscow Patriarchate did not merely fail to protect priests who faced pressure from the state for their anti-war stance: it itself initiated decisions which deprived them of the possibility of continuing their ministry and opened the way to state repression. To me, these circumstances recall the events of 1927–1931, when the Moscow ecclesiastical leadership under Metropolitan Sergius (Stragorodsky) began collaborating with the authorities and assisted the state in persecuting Christian confessors whom it regarded as undesirable. And who, if not we, the heirs of Metropolitan Eulogius, should stand up for these confessors?
3. Militarism in the Church
Having spoken about the persecution of clergy who opposed the war, we must turn to another aspect of what is happening: the public position of the hierarchy of the Moscow Patriarchate itself, its statements and the practices through which the war is given ecclesiastical justification.
What strikes us first is the glaring disparity. Priests who call for peace and refuse to pray for victory in the war against Ukraine are suspended from ministry and, in some cases, deposed from holy orders. At the same time, public glorification of military action, the blessing of weapons and military equipment, and even the direct participation of clergy in combat operations and religious justification of killing the enemy are not treated as obstacles to priestly ministry.
It is important to stress that this is not simply a matter of isolated statements by Patriarch Kirill or individual bishops. This position finds expression at the very highest level of ecclesiastical governance.
On 27 March 2024, under the chairmanship of Patriarch Kirill, the ‘Instruction of the 25th World Russian People's Council’ was adopted. It describes the war against Ukraine as ‘a new stage in the national liberation struggle of the Russian people’. Among its stated aims is the defence of the right to live ‘within the borders of a single Russian state’. The statement issued by the Council of our Archdiocese concerning this ‘Instruction’ was of fundamental importance. Unfortunately, however, in the time since then the hierarchy of the Moscow Patriarchate has not ceased presenting the war as a spiritual confrontation in which Russian servicemen supposedly fulfil a special moral and religious mission.
On 19 November 2025, speaking at the plenary session of the World Russian People's Council, Patriarch Kirill specifically addressed the commandment ‘Thou shalt not kill’. He declared that Russian servicemen taking part in the war against Ukraine were not breaking this commandment because, supposedly, they were defending their neighbours and resisting evil. Moreover, he invoked the notion of a ‘holy war’, linking participation in the present hostilities to the moral duty of defending the Fatherland.
Equally revealing are the activities of the Synodal Department of the Moscow Patriarchate for Co-operation with the Armed Forces and Law Enforcement Agencies, headed by Metropolitan Kirill of Stavropol and Nevinnomyssk.
On 28 April 2025 this department published a message congratulating snipers on their professional day. The text described a sniper as ‘a warrior of a special kind’, while his professional qualities — exceptional patience, composure, a steady hand and a keen eye — were associated with a special gift from God. The authors went on to say that a sniper's work demands intense concentration and that, remaining motionless and completely alone for hours, he ‘can excel in inner prayer as few others can’. In support, they quoted Holy Scripture: ‘Be strong and of a good courage’ (Joshua 1:6). The message ended by wishing snipers ‘a steady hand, God's help and the protection of their Guardian Angel’. The Moscow Patriarchate's ‘military department’ invites us to see a special affinity between the spiritual practice of noetic prayer and the sniper's work! A man who spends hours tracking another human being, choosing the moment to fire and aiming to hit his target is effectively held up as someone capable of ‘excelling in inner prayer’! The concentration necessary to kill an enemy is placed on the same level as standing in prayer before God. Noetic prayer, whose purpose is to lead a person towards purification of the heart and love for Christ, is effectively being used to exalt killing in war on religious grounds.
Weapons and military equipment destined for the war against Ukraine are constantly being blessed; Metropolitan Mark (Golovkov), who serves not far from us on Boulevard Branly, has been among those doing so. We must also mention clergy who did not confine themselves to the pastoral care of military personnel at the front, but went to the line of contact as direct participants in combat. One of the best-known cases concerns a priest who voluntarily went to fight in the war against Ukraine. According to his own account, he repeatedly carried out combat missions and took part in assaults. In March 2023 he returned and resumed serving as rector of his church. His diocesan authorities saw nothing in what had happened that prevented him from continuing his priestly ministry. Yet the priest himself refused to answer journalists when asked whether he had fired at people.
This case is particularly revealing in the light of the canonical requirements placed upon clergy. The Church's tradition takes a very strict view of a cleric's involvement in bloodshed and use of weapons against another human being. In this instance, however, the priest's participation in combat did not prevent him from returning to the celebration of divine services and continuing his pastoral ministry.
We cannot fail to recall another phrase that became widely known through a documentary film and has been repeated in numerous publications. These were the words of a priest addressed to residents of Ukrainian territory: ‘We have not come to liberate you; we have come to liberate the land from you.’ When such rhetoric comes from the mouth of a priest, it is no longer merely political propaganda, but tragic evidence of how far ecclesial consciousness can depart from the Gospel's understanding of the human person and human dignity.
We thus see a consistent course of action pursued at the highest levels of the Moscow Patriarchate and expressed in its official documents and statements, as well as in the activities of the Patriarch, senior bishops and synodal institutions.
For our Archdiocese this is not merely a question of how we assess the war politically. It is a question of the conscience of the Church, fidelity to the Gospel and the responsibility of the Orthodox Church towards those who suffer violence and injustice.
We cannot remain indifferent when the call for peace becomes grounds for ecclesiastical penalties and Holy Scripture is used to justify killing.
And if we, as an Archdiocese, regard ourselves as part of the Orthodox ecclesial tradition founded upon the Gospel, we cannot fail to offer a clear and unequivocal judgement on what is happening.
My dear friends, I ask you to read the text of this address and its appendix, which contains further details and a list of the clergy who have suffered. We shall welcome your ideas, support or criticism. Peace unto all!
Thank you for your attention.
Father Valerian Dunin-Barkovskiy
Mir Vsem / Friede Allen / Paix à Tous / Peace Unto All
6 November 2026 Paris–Düsseldorf
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Appendix. Clergy Subjected to Ecclesiastical Penalties for Their Anti-War Stance
This list includes clergy who were suspended from ministry or deposed from holy orders in connection with statements opposing the war, refusal to recite the ‘Prayer for Holy Rus’’, disagreement with the military rhetoric of the ecclesiastical leadership, or refusal to support military operations.
1. Deacon Dmitry Baev (Diocese of Vyatka) — suspended from ministry (11 March 2022); deposed from holy orders (September 2022). State persecution: criminal proceedings for allegedly spreading ‘fake news’ about the Russian Armed Forces, a search of his home, placement on the federal wanted list and inclusion in the Rosfinmonitoring register. Forced to leave Russia.
2. Father Ioann Burdin (Diocese of Kostroma) — forced to relinquish his position as rector and placed outside the active diocesan staff (April 2022); temporarily suspended from ministry (19 March 2023); the diocesan ecclesiastical court (16 June 2023) recommended that he be suspended until he made a public act of repentance. State persecution: an administrative fine of 35,000 roubles for an anti-war sermon (10 March 2022).
3. Archpriest Andrei Kordochkin (Diocese of Spain and Portugal) — removed as secretary of the Diocese of Spain and Portugal (August 2022); suspended from ministry for three months (February 2023). Subsequently forced formally to request release from the active diocesan staff. State persecution: designated a ‘foreign agent’ in Russia (2025) and subsequently fined for violating the rules governing the activities of a ‘foreign agent’.
4. Hieromonk Iakov (Vorontsov) (Metropolitan District in the Republic of Kazakhstan) — removed from ministry, then suspended from ministry; deposed from holy orders (10 August 2023), a decision confirmed by Patriarch Kirill. State persecution: criminal proceedings for allegedly inciting religious discord, initiated in December 2023 on the basis of his public criticism of the Russian Orthodox Church and its support for the war. The original case was closed in April 2025; in 2026 he was again detained and prosecuted on other charges.
5. Father Ioann Koval (Diocese of Moscow) — suspended from ministry by decree of Patriarch Kirill (2 February 2023); the Moscow Diocesan Court ruled to depose him from holy orders (11 May 2023), a decision subsequently confirmed by the Patriarch. The grounds were his refusal to recite the ‘Prayer for Holy Rus’’ in its original form and his substitution of the word ‘peace’ for ‘victory’. He was subsequently restored to holy orders by the Ecumenical Patriarchate and is now rector of the Church of St Alypius the Stylite in the Metropolis of Pisidia.
6. Archpriest Alexei Uminsky (Diocese of Moscow) — removed as rector and suspended from ministry by decree of Patriarch Kirill (3 January 2024); deposed from holy orders by a decision of the Moscow Diocesan Court (13 January 2024), confirmed by the Patriarch on 8 February 2024. The grounds were his refusal to recite the ‘Prayer for Holy Rus’’. He was subsequently restored to holy orders by the Ecumenical Patriarchate and is a cleric of the Greek Orthodox Metropolis of France.
7. Father Andrei Kudrin (Diocese of Moscow) — suspended from ministry by decree of Patriarch Kirill (April 2024); deposed from holy orders by a decision of the Moscow Diocesan Court (10 July 2024), confirmed by the Patriarch on 14 August 2024. The grounds were his refusal to recite the prayer for victory and his substitution of a prayer for the reconciliation of those at enmity.
8. Father Konstantin Kokora (Diocese of Moscow) — suspended from ministry for three years (15 October 2024); deposed from holy orders by a decision of the Moscow Diocesan Court (11 June 2026), confirmed by Patriarch Kirill on 26 June 2026. The grounds were his refusal to recite the ‘Prayer for Holy Rus’’. In March 2026 he was forced to leave for France with his family.
9. Father Alexei Vtulov (Diocese of Podolsk) — suspended from ministry for one year (17 November 2023); the suspension was subsequently extended for a further three years. Deprived of the right to wear his pectoral cross and cassock or to give blessings; assigned the duties of a reader and cantor (psalomshchik). The reason was his refusal to recite the ‘Prayer for Holy Rus’’.
10. Father Alexander Vostrodymov (Diocese of Sergiev Posad) — suspended from ministry (28 March 2024); suspension extended for a further six months (6 June 2024). The formal grounds given were ‘inappropriate statements on the internet’. He had signed the anti-war appeal by Russian Orthodox clergy and publicly opposed the war.
11. Father Ilya Gavryshkiv (Diocese of Rzhev) — subjected to coercive ecclesiastical disciplinary measures: forced to sign a letter of repentance and publicly repent before parishioners for reciting a prayer for peace instead of a prayer for victory. Bishop Adrian threatened him with suspension from ministry and subsequent deposition from holy orders.
12. Father Alexander Dombrovsky (Diocese of Klintsy) — suspended from ministry and placed outside the active diocesan staff after a conflict with diocesan authorities. Deposed from holy orders in 2023. State persecution: summoned by the police, informed of the opening of an FSB case following a statement by the churchwarden; forced to leave Russia.
13. Archpriest Andrei Drugai (Diocese of Ekaterinodar) — suspended from ministry until his return to the diocese (4 June 2024). The formal grounds were unauthorised departure from the diocese; the actual reasons were his opposition to the war and refusal to recite the ‘Prayer for Holy Rus’’. He moved to the United States and was received into the clergy of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America under the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
14. Archpriest Vadim Kuzmitsky (Diocese of Kalach) — removed from ministry; deposed from holy orders (decision of the Diocese of Kalach confirmed on 11 July 2025). Formal grounds: ‘departure from the diocese’ and ‘cessation of communication with the ruling bishop’. State persecution: threats of criminal prosecution and forced emigration to Georgia.
15. Father Dimitry Safronov (Diocese of Moscow) — suspended from ministry for three years by decree of Patriarch Kirill dated 15 April 2024 for refusing to recite the ‘Prayer for Holy Rus’’ and for serving a memorial service at Alexei Navalny's grave on 26 March 2024, the fortieth day after his death.
16. Archimandrite Kirill Hovorun (Diocese of Moscow) — suspended from ministry by decree of Patriarch Kirill (25 September 2023); deposed from holy orders by a decision of the Moscow Diocesan Court (31 October 2023), confirmed by the Patriarch on 29 December 2023.
17. Archpriest Andrei Lorgus (Diocese of Moscow) — deposed from holy orders by a decision of the Moscow Diocesan Court dated 23 December 2025, confirmed by decree of Patriarch Kirill dated 20 February 2026. He had previously signed the anti-war appeal by Russian Orthodox clergy and spoken publicly against the war.
18. Father Maxim Nagibin (Diocese of Armavir) — deposed from holy orders by a decision of the ecclesiastical court of the Diocese of Armavir (14 November 2022), following a public sermon in which he called the war against Ukraine a crime and a disgrace to Russia. State persecution: administrative proceedings concerning his anti-war sermon; the proceedings were terminated because the limitation period had expired.
19. Archpriest Vadim Perminov (Diocese of Kainsk) — transferred to a rural church after refusing to recite the prayer for victory; subsequently suspended from ministry. He explained in writing to Metropolitan Nikodim that he could not pray for victory in a fratricidal war between Orthodox Christians.
20. Father Nikolai Platonov (Diocese of Chelyabinsk) — suspended from ministry after publicly condemning the war. He had previously requested release from the active diocesan staff and signed an appeal by Russian Orthodox clergy calling for an end to the war. He was subsequently forced to leave Russia.
21. Archpriest Sergiy Rybakov (Samara) — forced to relinquish his position as rector and placed outside the active diocesan staff; suspended from ministry (15 September 2023). State pressure: according to the priest, the Metropolitan told him that the FSB was interested in him; threats against him, his family and parishioners followed.
22. Protodeacon Andrei Kuraev — deposed from holy orders by decree of Patriarch Kirill (28 April 2023).
23. Hieromonk Afanasy Bukin (Diocese of St Petersburg) — suspended from ministry by decree of Patriarch Kirill dated 20 February 2023; deposed from holy orders by a decision of an ecclesiastical court (12 April 2023), subsequently confirmed by the Patriarch. He left the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Jerusalem, stating that he did not wish to be complicit in the military aggression against Ukraine. He is now an archimandrite and a cleric of the Metropolis of Belgium under the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
24. Father Dmitry Ostanin (Bergen, Norway) — recalled to the jurisdiction of the Patriarch by a decision of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church (12 March 2024); suspended from ministry by decree of the Patriarch (7 June 2024); deposed from holy orders by a decision of the Moscow Diocesan Court dated 22 July 2024, confirmed by Patriarch Kirill. The grounds were his open opposition to the war and his signature of the anti-war appeal by clergy.
25. Father Dionisy Korostelyov (Diocese of Minsk, Belarusian Orthodox Church) — forbidden to perform sacred rites until he repented (4 January 2023), after serving a moleben and reading a prayer request ‘for the soldiers and defenders of Ukraine’. State persecution: detention by GUBOPiK, forced recording of a video of repentance and fourteen days' administrative detention.
26. Archpriest Pyotr Prokoptsov (Diocese of Gomel, Belarusian Orthodox Church) — suspended from ministry by Archbishop Stefan of Gomel after refusing to bless military equipment intended for strikes against Ukraine. The bishop also threatened him with deposition from holy orders. State pressure: questioning by KGB officers, coercion to sign a formal warning and forced departure from Belarus.
27. Archpriest Vitalius Mockus (Diocese of Lithuania) — dismissed from his posts as diocesan chancellor, dean of the Vilnius deanery and rector of the cathedral; suspended from ministry (10 May 2022); deposed from holy orders (29 June 2022).
28. Father Vitalis Dauparas (Diocese of Lithuania) — placed outside the active diocesan staff; suspended from ministry (10 May 2022); deposed from holy orders (29 June 2022).
29. Father Jurgis Gintaras Sungaila (Diocese of Lithuania) — placed outside the active diocesan staff; suspended from ministry (10 May 2022); deposed from holy orders (23 June 2022).
30. Father Georgy Ananyev (Diocese of Lithuania) — suspended from ministry (10 May 2022); deposed from holy orders (29 June 2022).
31. Archpriest Vladimir Selyavko (Diocese of Lithuania) — suspended from ministry (10 May 2022); deposed from holy orders (29 June 2022).
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